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Abstract
Mapping the religious field of present-day Western cultures such as America and 
Europe requires a synopsis of perspectives. There are, on the one hand, classical 
ways of defining religion in theology, sociology and psychology, and also estab-
lished sociological models of the religious field; and there are, on the other hand, 
recent changes in how people on the street implicitly and explicitly understand 
themselves and behave. Many are reluctant to identify as religious persons, but 
self-identify as “spiritual” or “spiritual, not religious.” In this text we intro-
duce our conceptualization of religion and of the religious field. Key concepts of 
religion are transcendence and ultimacy. For structuring the religious field, we 
attend to the distinction between vertical and horizontal symbolization of tran-
scendence and ultimacy, and to the distinction between institutional mediation 
and individual immediacy. 
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The increase in the use of the self-description, as being “spiritual,” and 
even “spiritual, but not religious,” can be taken as an indication of a major 
change in the religious landscape (Hood 2003). Many scholars declare 
“spirituality” rather than “religion” as the object of their theorizing and 
empirical research, suggesting that spirituality may replace religion as a 
dominant motif in the religious field (Houtman and Aupers 2007). We 
see this as a problem insofar as it risks ignoring the roots of a more than 
a century-long discourse on religion, which has been a major object of 
study in the early days of both sociology and psychology. Therefore, as 
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argued in previous texts (Streib and Hood 2011), we will step back and 
focus on the concept of religion in classical conceptualizations, in order to 
aid understanding of the contemporary religious field. Our intent is not to 
seek a unidirectional interpretative movement and simply go to the clas-
sics and apply them to the contemporary situation. Rather, it is in fact a 
two-directional interpretation: Contemporary changes in religiosity also 
suggest revisions and modifications of the classics. Thus in this text we 
want to both reinstate and reinterpret the classics, in order to understand 
the contemporary religious field.
For constructing a model of the religious field for America and Europe, 
two key questions can be stated, as follows: First, what concept of religion 
is inclusive, but precise enough, for understanding and analyzing contem-
porary religiosity, spirituality and related world views? Second, how can we 
come to terms with the drift from the churches, i.e. account, in an up-to-
date model of the religious field, for the emigration of religiosity, spiritual-
ity and related world views from organized religion? So, we will explain in 
some detail both our conceptualization of religion and our model of the 
religious field. Key concepts in our model are transcendence and ultimacy. 
We will explicate why it is helpful to ground a concept of religion on 
these components. In a second step, our model of the religious field will 
be introduced, focusing upon a distinction between vertical and horizontal 
symbolization of transcendence and ultimacy, and a distinction between 
individual immediacy and institutional mediation. 
Conceptualizing “religion”
For conceptualizing religion and defining its basic elements, we suggest 
starting with and focusing on the most elementary experiential and struc-
tural characteristics, rather than on a plentitude of substantive or functional 
characteristics. This does not mean that we disregard or oppose substan-
tive (e.g. divine beings; supernatural agents) or functional (e.g. complex-
ity reduction; coping with contingencies and anxiety; social integration) 
characteristics, but we suggest regarding them as secondary and putting 
them on hold, in order to bring the elementary to the foreground. Such 
a starting point, with the basic experiential and structural elements, cor-
responds well with psychology, because its object is the individual, or, more 
specifically: individual experiences, beliefs, attitudes and commitments 
in their relation to behavior and action in the social environment. From 
such a central position of the individual, for which we may (e.g.) refer to 
W. James (1902/1985), our focus is on individual religiosity, and the reli-
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gious individual as actor in the religious field. For our approach therefore 
it may be adequate to use conceptual markers for “religion” which are verb-
like and describe the experiences, attitudes and activities of the individual.
In psychology, the sacred has served as an influential definitional marker 
for religion and spirituality (Pargament 1997; Zinnbauer, Pargament and 
Scott 1999; Zinnbauer and Pargament 2005). Because, in most of these 
contributions, the concept of the sacred oscillates between the human 
activity of “sacralizing”—which indeed is verb-like—and the assumption 
of a reality out there that we call the sacred, it may be adequate to look for 
alternatives. Methodological agnosticism implies that we refrain from any 
presupposition of a supernatural world or sacred realm, while remaining 
open to the fact that individuals may be viewed as not only involved in a 
search for, or the imagination of, the supernatural or sacred, but may also 
be viewed as responding to the supernatural or sacred, especially when the 
focus is upon religious experience ( James 1902/1985; Otto 1917/1958). 
It is on the basis of this tradition that we propose two characteristics for 
conceptualizing religion.
Transcendence and ultimacy as key characteristics of “religion”
Our key concepts for religion are transcendence and ultimacy. For “tran-
scendence,” we refer to the social-phenomenological tradition of A. Schütz 
(1989) and T. Luckmann (1967; 1991; cf. Knoblauch 1991). For “ultimacy” 
we refer to the concept of ultimate concern in P. Tillich’s (1925; 1951; 1957) 
philosophy of religion. Both transcendence and ultimacy have a verb-like 
character: transcendence refers to “transcending the everyday world,” and 
ultimacy to be committed and “to be ultimately concerned.” The expe-
rience of transcending only secondarily finds its way into symbolization 
and into the social construction of reality, i.e. in the dimension of beliefs. 
Thus we find it useful to distinguish an immediate experience from what is 
subsequently an elaborate interpretation of experience, which is associated 
with religion as both belief and institutionalization or the social construc-
tions associated with religious experience (Hood 2006; Hood, Hill and 
Spilka 2009, Chs. 10, 11). Both concepts (transcending and being ulti-
mately concerned) are necessary and complement each other. 
Transcending everyday reality is possible in a variety of ways and direc-
tions. As suggested by Schütz (1989, 117–130) and Luckmann (1991, 
164–182), “great” transcendences occur in sleep and dream, in daydream-
ing and ecstasies, in crises and death and finally in theoretical orienta-
tions. Thereby, it would be a misunderstanding to take any kind of “great” 
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transcendence as religion. On the contrary, this conceptual approach to 
religion is based on the process of transcending in various provinces of 
the life-world. Which experiences of transcendence are associated with 
religion, depends on the symbol-system that is used to come to terms with 
these experiences. The religious symbolization depends on the religious 
character of the social construction of reality with which the individual 
is at home. Thus, the social construction of reality can be in response to a 
sensed sacred reality and need not be prior to an experience, but only later 
seen as explicitly sacred (Hood 2006).
We regard transcendence as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition 
for religion. Transcendence is a central (necessary) condition for religion, 
because it claims a) that religion is grounded in experiences (which only sec-
ondarily are reconstructed in symbols and rituals—which qualify religion 
as meaning-making); b) that religion is grounded in experiences of dis-
tance and departure from the  everyday, of interruption of everyday, or being 
drawn into another “world;” and c) that these experiences of transcendence 
per se are not divided into natural and supernatural, because these experi-
ences occur in the life-world—and only secondarily are narrated in stories 
and thus interpreted in different religious symbol-systems. These charac-
teristics indicate that a concept of religion, based on this understanding of 
transcendence, is particularly open for an inclusion of what we later call 
“horizontal transcendence.” 
If we state that transcendence is a necessary, but not sufficient defini-
tional characterization of religion, we need to say in what way it is not suf-
ficient. Interpreting religion as based upon experiences of transcendence, 
does not say anything about the importance or centrality of these experi-
ences and their symbolic reconstruction for the individual. In principle, 
such experiences could be marginal, occasional and insignificant for the 
life of the individual. But there is another, and perhaps more serious, defi-
nitional insufficiency and need for precision: What defines a symboliza-
tion as “religious” symbolization?  If it is not simply the experience of tran-
scendence per se, then another criterion is required. Instead of referring to 
the variety of substantive and functional criteria, we suggest an elementary 
alternative: Tillich’s conceptualization of religion. His notion of ultimacy 
helps to identify the symbolization of experiences of transcending that are 
not simply important, but ultimately important for the individual, because 
they respond to ultimate questions and refer to an ultimate environment. 
In Dynamics of Faith, we read: 
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Faith is the state of being ultimately concerned: the dynamics of faith are 
the dynamics of man’s ultimate concern. Man, like every living being, is 
concerned about many things, above all about those which condition his 
very existence, such as food and shelter. But man, in contrast to other living 
beings, has spiritual concerns—cognitive, aesthetic, social, political. Some 
of them are urgent, often extremely urgent, and each of them as well as the 
vital concerns can claim ultimacy for a human life or the life of a social 
group. […] If faith is the state of being ultimately concerned, all prelimi-
nary concerns are subject to it. The ultimate concern gives depth, direction 
and unity to all other concerns and, with them, to the whole personality.
(Tillich 1957, 105) 
Tillich, as we see in this quotation, claims a kind of hierarchical order 
of concerns. Thus, “(W)hat concerns one ultimately becomes holy” (12f ). 
Tillich links ultimate concern with the holy, but interestingly enough, in 
a verb-like formulation: they become holy. This is consistent with Tillich’s 
view that also totally this-worldly concerns can become ultimate and holy, 
such as success, nation or a political leader—which Tillich, from his theo-
logical standpoint, qualifies (of course) as “idolatrous faith.” 
Summarizing our argument so far, in a definition, we may propose that 
religion is the symbolic and ritual, thus social construction of experiences of 
“great” transcendences in terms of ultimate concern. 
Specific difference A: vertical vs. horizontal
Combining the concept of transcendence (Schütz; Luckmann) and the 
concept of ultimacy (Tillich) in a definition of religion has a great advan-
tage in regard to a more inclusive, somewhat broader, but still precise 
understanding of religion. This understanding of religion is open to, but 
does not require, an exclusive directedness towards a heaven or a “world 
above,” with divine beings or supernatural agents—however the individual 
may envision this other world in substantive terms. But it is also open to 
the possibility that symbolizations of transcendences and ultimate concern 
are directed toward things, causes or concerns within and part of this world. 
Thus on the basis of our understanding of religion we may distinguish 
between a vertical and a horizontal symbolization of transcendence and 
ultimate concern. 
The distinction between vertical and horizontal transcendence has been 
proposed by Hood et al. (2009, e.g. 282, 286); it is meant to prevent the 
misunderstanding of people who are not religiously affiliated, or identify 
with non-theism, agnosticism or humanism, but who explicitly self-iden-
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tify as “spiritual,” or are committed to a variant of religion which we may 
call “implicit religion.” 
Thus the distinction between vertical and horizontal reflects the distinc-
tion between implicit and explicit religion. The concept of implicit religion 
is highly important for the analysis of contemporary religions in cultures 
such as in America and Europe. This has been demonstrated by E. Bailey’s 
(1997; 2002) studies. An elaborate conceptualization of implicit religion 
has been proposed by G. Thomas (2001), which in turn owes much to 
F.-X. Kaufmann’s (1989) poly-thetic, but primarily functionalist under-
standing of religion. In Thomas’ (2001) study, the “implicit” is considered a 
derivative of the “explicit.” The distinction between vertical and horizontal 
however regards both as equal, and avoids such primary-secondary hier-
archy. Nevertheless, for our mapping of the religious field, the concept of 
implicit religion plays an important role, because it suggests identifying 
forms of religion which feature a horizontal symbolization of transcend-
ence and ultimacy and usually are not regarded as religion.
Interesting here is Pasquale’s (2007) identification of (what he calls) 
“non-transcendentalist,” self-identifying “spiritual” people in the North 
West of the US. There is also some parallel of horizontal transcendence 
with what Taylor (2007, e.g. 726) calls “immanent transcendence.” The 
vertical-horizontal distinction allows us to interpret transcendences and 
concerns in this world as religion. 
The distinction between vertical and horizontal transcendence and ulti-
macy suggests including those segments in the religious field which previ-
ously have been (mis-) understood as non-religious and outside the reli-
gious field. What we now label “horizontal transcendence and ultimacy” 
has been lumped together with the “secular,” with “unbelief ” or “exclu-
sion of transcendence,”1 and thus has not been regarded as religious. Our 
concept of horizontal transcendence allows us to include those types of 
experiences, attitudes and concerns as (implicit) religion, which qualify as 
“great” transcendences and have become the ultimate concern. This kind 
1. Here we see one of the shortcomings of the conceptual model on which the Post-Crit-
ical Belief Scale (Hutsebaut 1996; Duriez, Fontaine and Hutsebaut 2000; Fontaine, 
Duriez, Luyten and Hutsebaut 2003; Duriez, Soenens and Hutsebaut 2005) is based. 
The PCBS is not responsive to horizontal transcendence, but is based on Wulff ’s 
(1997, 635) problematic polarization between inclusion of transcendence and exclu-
sion of transcendence. In this polarization it is presupposed as taken-for-granted 
what transcendence means—a kind of taken-for-granted normativity that stands also 
behind the distinction between belief and unbelief.
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of implicit religion applies to those persons who may identify themselves 
as “spiritual but not religious,” or as “more spiritual than religious” (Hood 
2003; Streib et al. 2009).
The distinction between vertical and horizontal could constitute one 
dimension of the religious field. Table 1 visualizes this dimension as axis y, 
the horizontal vs. vertical axis. To describe the endpoints on the vertical 
and horizontal axis: Vertical transcendence and ultimacy is characterized 
a) by the social reconstruction of experiences of “great” transcendences 
in otherworldly symbols, and b) by a direction of ultimate concern to a 
supernatural world; the most common symbol here is “heaven” with God, 
or gods or other divine beings. Horizontal transcendence and ultimacy is 
characterized a) by the social reconstruction of experiences of “great” tran-
scendences in this-worldly symbols, e.g. as “generalized entanglement,”2 or 
in metaphors of wholeness, and b) by a direction of ultimate concern to the 
sanctity and the creative potential of life, including the individual person, 
humanity, or nature. 
The distinction between vertical and horizontal transcendence and ulti-
mate concern is however not an either-or division. Vertical and horizontal 
can occur in combination and there may be even some kind of middle 
ground. The reason for this is obvious: the way of coming to terms with 
and communicating experiences of transcendence depends on the vari-
ety of symbol systems that are available and alive in a specific culture. 
And symbol systems are changing—which is perhaps the major factor of 
change in the religious fields in America and Europe. 
For a characterization of the middle ground between horizontal and ver-
tical transcendence and ultimacy, we refer to the distinction between the-
istic and non-theistic. There is a broad variety of non-theistic symboliza-
tions in established religious traditions as well as new religious movements 
and charismatic groups: for example animistic, pantheistic, spiritualistic or 
esoteric3 symbolizations. Here the direction of transcendence and ultimate 
2. Walach and colleagues (2009, 275) define spirituality as the relation of the individual 
to the whole—a relation which includes experience, motivation and action. In order 
to understand spirituality, Walach and colleagues propose a model of “generalized 
entanglement” which is related to quantum theory. They understand generalized 
entanglement as “a formal and scientific way of explaining spirituality as alignment of 
an individual with a whole, which, according to the model, inevitably leads to non-lo-
cal correlations.”
3. Faivre (2010, 12) characterizes esotericism as follows: “The four fundamental charac-
terstics are as follows: 1. The idea of universal correspondences. Non-“causal” corre-
spondences operate between all the levels of the universe. 2. The idea of living Nature. 
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concern is not necessarily vertical in the sense of a clear and primary con-
cern with a heaven, complete with God(s) or divine beings; but it is not 
simply horizontal either, since an “other world” or realm is not denied. In 
many instances there is the imagination of a world “behind,” as residence 
for the dead, ghosts, angels, supernatural helpers or simply cosmic energy. 
It is very likely that people with this kind of middle ground between verti-
cal and horizontal transcendence may be hesitant to self-identify as “reli-
gious,” but—even if it is only because of the lack of alternatives—they 
self-identify rather as “spiritual.” Thereby “spirituality” refers to a “world 
behind” and not simply to the (perhaps not yet discovered or acknowl-
edged) relations within nature, as for example is assumed in “generalized 
entanglement.” Table 1 illustrates vertical and horizontal transcendences, 
but accounting also for this middle ground in form of the middle row.
Specific difference B: institutional mediation vs. individual mediation 
Individualization has become one of the most influential characterizations 
of modern religious culture in Western societies. It assumes that experi-
ences, beliefs and practices, which for centuries have been embedded in, 
mediated through, and controlled by, religious institutions, have increasingly 
become the private affair of individuals. We may talk about a process of de-
institutionalization of religion (Hood et al. 2009, 372–380; Streib 2007). 
Luckmann, together with Berger (Berger and Luckmann 1966; 
Berger 1967; 1979), described individualism as a major transition 
in modern cultures, heavily influencing also the religious domain 
(Luckmann 1963; 1967). It is Luckmann’s argument that religion 
has not disappeared in modernity, but that religion has changed its 
form: it moved from institutional dependency to individual auton-
omy and individual preference. Therefore Luckmann talks about 
“invisible religion”—which claims that part of religion has become 
invisible on the screens of sociologists who primarily attend to insti-
tutionalized and organized phenomena. Of course, such expertise is 
possible only because Luckmann’s rather wide concept of religion 
The cosmos is not only a series of correspondences. Permeated with invisible but 
active forces, the whole of Nature, considered as a living organism, as a person, as a 
history, connected with that of the human being and of the divine world. 3. The role 
of mediations and of the imagination. These two notions are mutually complemen-
tary. 4. The experience of transmutation. ... It is the transformation of oneself, which 
can be a “second birth”; and as a corollary of a part of Nature (e.g., in a number of 
alchemical texts).”
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includes a primary focus on individual experiences of transcend-
ences and communicative reconstructions which eventually remain 
purely individual. 
Berger (1979) perhaps went one step further, when introducing the 
notion of a “heretical imperative” which suggests that persons in modern 
Western societies have to make an individual choice about their religious 
preference and affiliation.4 Of course, this does not exclude the possibility 
that people make a choice in favor of their institutional affiliation, that 
they subject themselves to institutional authority, because they prefer a 
strong frame of reference. But Berger proposed three options for religious 
thought: reassertion of authority and tradition (deductive option), inter-
pretation of the tradition in terms of modern secularity (reductive option), 
and the resort to experience as ground of religious affir mations (induc-
tive option). In these options, we can discern the polarity between institu-
tional mediation vs. individual mediation—which will become the second 
dimension for our construction of the religious field.
It is the merit of E. Troeltsch to have described religious individualism 
decades earlier—however not as a new phenomenon in the contemporary 
religious landscape of his time, but as a type of religiosity that has been 
around for centuries: mysticism. Troeltsch, in the second volume of his 
Social Teachings of the Christian Church (Troeltsch 1912), has dealt exten-
sively with mysticism. Interestingly, Troeltsch’s terms are “mysticism” and 
“spiritual religion.” His definition of mysticism in “the widest sense of the 
word” is this: mysticism “is simply the insistence upon a direct inward and 
present religious experience” (Troeltsch 1912, 730). Mysticism “expresses 
itself in ecstasy and frenzy, in visions and hallucinations, in subjective 
religious experience and ‘inwardness,’ in concentration upon the purely 
interior and emotional side of religious experience” (Troeltsch 1912, 731). 
With its “immediacy of feeling,” Troeltsch (1912, 731) says, mysticism 
develops “a certain hostility to popular religion and its average forms of 
expression.” Thus in his historical analysis and portrait of mysticism, Tro-
eltsch presents a clear polarity between individual immediacy and insti-
tutional mediation. But more: this polarity is presented as a frequent, and 
rather inevitable, development in the history of religion. 
4. Results from our study of deconversion (Streib, Hood, Keller, Csöff, and Silver 2009) 
even suggests that this choice does not have to be a once-in-a lifetime decision, but 
there are multiple deconversions and conversions possible. This is consistent with a 
vast empirical literature on conversion, spiritual transformation, and deconversion 
(Hood et al., 2009, Ch. 8).
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It is important in regard to our construction of the religious field that 
Troeltsch also accounts for a type of mysticism outside organized religion. 
Troeltsch indicates a clear difference between the mysticism that dwells 
and remains inside the Christian tradition, on the one hand, and what 
Parsons (1999, 141) has called “unchurched mysticism,” on the other hand. 
Troeltsch (1912, 743) identifies a mysticism that has become independent 
in principle from, and is contrasted with, churched religion: 
The active energies in mysticism of this kind can become independent in 
principle, contrasted with concrete religion; they then break away from it 
and set up a theory of their own which takes the place of the concrete reli-
gion and of its mythos or doctrine; this may take place either by means of 
open denial, or through an allegorical change in interpretation. When this 
takes place, however, mysticism realizes that it is an independent religious 
principle; it sees itself as the real universal heart of all religion, of which the 
various myth-forms are merely the outer garment. 
For this type of mysticism, Troeltsch (1912, 734) maintains that “it feels 
independent of all institutional religion, and possesses an entire inward 
certainty, which makes it indifferent towards every kind of religious fel-
lowship.” This is what many today profess to be “spirituality,” as opposed to 
“religion.” It is essentially an unchurched mysticism. 
The problem with Troeltsch’s expertise may be that he talks about mysti-
cism primarily in Christianity as it emerged historically. But his identifica-
tion of religious individualism, including mysticism as a third ideal type, 
was thoughtful and perhaps ahead of his time (Hood and Chen 2013). 
We witness today a global spread of just this kind of religious individualism. 
Taken together, Troeltsch’s detailed historical analysis of mysticism, 
Luckmann’s analysis of invisible religion, and Berger’s heretical impera-
tive describe the emergence of an experience-based individual religiosity 
which is not embedded in religious organizations and does not need, and 
perhaps does not even accept, any institutional mediation. Thus we think 
it is justified to construct a second specific difference for our conceptu-
alization of religion, in order to account for an important differentiation 
in the religious field: that between individual mediation and institutional 
mediation. To characterize both poles of the polarity: Institutionalized 
mediation says that, for the individual, there is no other way to transcend-
ence but through the church, the sacraments and priests; that there is no 
other truth than the institutionally sanctioned teachings; and that the ulti-
mate concern is determined by the institution and its tradition. Consist-
ently, institutional mediation requires religious institutions or organization 
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with a high degree of organization and an established wealth of resources. 
At the other pole of the spectrum, there is no or very low mediation of 
trans cendence, but instead the experiential immediacy of the individual; 
there are no claims of absoluteness, but individualistic evidence based on 
experience; there is also no or very low degree of organizational structure. 
It is the kind of religion that we (Streib and Hood 2001) have called the 
“privatized, experience-oriented religion.”
Following the expertise of Weber and Bourdieu, we conceptualize also 
here a middle ground, a third option. This third way of mediation is labeled 
charismatic, and so reflects the sect type of mediation through a prophetic 
and charismatic person. Readers familiar with the sociological tradition of 
Weber, Troeltsch and Bourdieu immediately understand that this reflects 
the differentiation of three types of actors in the religious field, between 
a) church/priest, b) sect/prophet, and c) magician or mystic. This will be 
explained in more detail in the next section.
Modeling the religious field 
The legacy of the classics 
The basic pattern for a model of the religious field is the distinction between 
church and sect, as we derive it from the sociological expertise of Weber 
and Troeltsch.5 The church-sect distinction has become one of the basic 
tools for understanding religion in sociological terms and for constructing 
the religious field. This distinction plays a role also in the sociology of new 
religious movements—even though the terminology has changed, as we 
avoid the term “sect,” in favor of “new religious movements.” 
Taking a closer look into Weber’s work, especially in his analyses in 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (Weber 1921), we find a distinction, not between 
two, but between three actors. Not only the sects with their prophets compete 
with the churches and their priests; the third party is the magicians. What 
has been widely ignored, but is therefore all the more necessary to recall 
(Daiber 2002, 329), is that Troeltsch (1911; 1912) also talks about three 
types, but called this third type mysticism.6 Troeltsch was clearly using an 
5. See the Verhandlungen des Ersten Deutschen Soziologentages October 19–22, 1910 
in Frankfurt a. M. (Simmel 1911).
6. Troeltsch’s mystic of course is different from Weber’s magician. The magician is 
characterized by Weber as a practitioner of magic coercion, a “small independent 
entrepreneur hired by private individuals on an ad hoc basis and exercising his office 
outside any recognized institution, most often in clandestine manner,” as Bourdieu 
(1987, 134) summarizes Weber’s perspective.
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expanded typology, derived from Weber in which, besides church and sect as 
forms of religious organization, he identified mysticism as the third type—
an expertise which has been marginalized, especially in the United States.7
Bourdieu’s (1971) work sets the stage for a sociological analysis of what 
is called the “religious field.” His model of the religious field is close to 
Weber’s in respect to the religious expert actors and their characterization. 
It is noteworthy that it also includes a third religious expert actor—which, 
for Bourdieu, in accord with Weber, is the magician. But Bourdieu’s special 
concern has been the dynamic in the (religious) field.
According to Bourdieu,8 a field is constituted by the dynamics of com-
petition which follow a field-specific principle (nomos) and field-specific 
“rules of the game.” Thus actors (specialists who best know, and act accord-
ing to, the rules of the game) compete with each other, and invest and 
accumulate the specific type of capital which is relevant to the field. They 
act on the basis of “wealth,” i.e. previous achievements, previous accumu-
lation of capital. Thus, in the framework of this rather strict economic 
model of the field, as presented in Schäfer et al.’s (2008) careful reading 
of Bourdieu, already the relations with the lay people appear as “external 
relations.” Bourdieu, however, in his (1971, 6) sketch of the religious field, 
has seen the necessity to include the lay people as a fourth pole in the 
religious field. Bourdieu used two different arrows to indicate the distinc-
tion between the kind of relation between the specialist actors and the lay 
people: specialist actors (church, sect, magician) interact in relations of 
competition; lay people interact with these religious suppliers in relations 
of “transactions” or exchange of commodities. This clear increase in value 
and significance for the lay people may be taken as justification for us to 
go even one step further, and consider the influence of lay people on the 
change in the contemporary religious fields. 
7. Ironically, Troeltsch was popularized among North American scholars by H. R. 
Niebuhr, especially in his The So cial Sources of Denominationalism (Niebuhr 1929) 
which was first published in 1929, thus antedating the English trans lation of Tro-
eltsch’s text by 2 years. Niebuhr however dropped Troeltsch’s third type, mysticism, so 
that subsequent theorizing and empirical research on church-sect theory has largely 
ignored mys ticism. The reasons for this are in dispute, but it is clear that neither 
Niebuhr nor Troeltsch thought well of mysticism and that neither saw it as charac-
teristic of the North American religious landscape (Garrett 1975; Steeman 1975). 
Whatever the reason, as Garrett (1975, 205) has noted, mysticism has experienced 
“wholehearted neglect” at the hands of socio logical investigators. 
8. For a comprehensive characterization of Bourdieu’s categories in his conceptualiza-
tion of a “field,” see Schäfer, Seibert, Hahne, Tovar and Stockmeier (2008).
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There are more questions than answers in regard to the application of 
Bourdieu’s strict economic model to the religious domain. Several ques-
tions are not easy to answer: What exactly is the “nomos” of the religious 
field? What are the “rules of the game” here? What is “religious capital”? 
What is the “product,” what are the “means of production” in the religious 
field? Perhaps these questions will be answered in the future and allow for 
a genuine construction of the religious field in strict Bourdieuian terms. 
In our construction of the religious fields in Europe and America in order 
to structure our research and account for the variety of ways of affiliating 
with and practicing religion, spirituality and related world views, we can-
not solve all the open questions in the interpretation of Bourdieu’s work. 
For our purpose, the following characteristics of a “field” are important. 
There is competition between various religious actors; religious actors 
compete with each other in attracting lay people as clients; religious actors 
greatly differ in the degree of achievement and “wealth.” But already the 
“wealth” of a religious actor is difficult to specify: We could take the degree 
of organization, the number of personnel, the weight of a tradition, its 
influence in culture and society etc. as indicators. But this can be very low 
or zero, as in the case of the magicians or mystics, yet nevertheless, magi-
cians and mystics can become serious competitors in the religious field. 
Thus there must be something else to constitute the “wealth”—in other 
words: the religious capital—of a religious actor. 
The discussion of the concept of religion in part one of this text and 
our conclusions there may help us to find an answer to the question of 
religious capital and thus allow us to construct the religious field in a way 
that does not contradict, but includes, Bourdieu’s, Weber’s and Troeltsch’s 
expertise. Here is our suggestion: The “wealth” or capital of religious actors 
is their expertise in transcendence management. This includes: a) Media-
tion of transcendence, i.e. expertise in the most plausible answers about 
how to make, cope with, and come to terms with experiences of “great” 
trans cenden ces, in such a way that the creative potential of the individual 
profits most; b) Mediation of ultimate concern, i.e. expertise in the most 
plausible answers to questions of meaning-making, in the supply of the 
best answers to questions of ultimate concern. This immediately makes 
clear that a religious actor with no organization, no personnel, no tradition, 
no claims of institutional mediation, can still hold the most capital and can 
very successfully compete with established and well-organized religious 
actors. This may be the reason for the success of “spiritual” actors who are 
completely un-organized. 
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Reconstruction of the religious field
We thus suggest for the construction of the religious field specific coordi-
nates which take up the thread, but are slightly different, from the classics 
we have discussed. But this can be justified: The model of the religious 
field has been designed to account for the dynamics of change in institu-
tionalized religion; its primary focus has been on the religious institutions, 
on the churches as the established and “wealthy” institutions in the first 
place, and secondarily on the sects and prophetic movements as serious 
competitors in the religious field. About the third type of specialist actors 
in the religious field—whether it is the magician (Weber; Bourdieu) or 
the mystic (Troeltsch)—there has been uncertainty already in the early 
sociological discourse regarding their organizational status and sociologi-
cal relevance. 
With reference to a plentitude of studies of contemporary religiosity, 
we conclude that there is an important—and possibly growing—segment 
of the religious field which has sociological relevance, but is clearly and 
radically individualistic, and which features individual immediacy to the 
transcendent and allows for no authority other than the individual expe-
rience-based evidence. Of the three classics, we find most resonance with 
the detailed and thoughtful analysis of Troeltsch on mysticism. Therefore 
we find it justified to include all kinds of mysticism and radically individu-
alized religiosity in the religious field and indicate that it is located in a low 
or un-organized segment of the religious field (we may talk about religious 
or spiritual scenes, occasional networks), and thus claim for the mystic the 
status of a full, powerful and eventually wealthy religious actor. 
In a second step of reflection, we need to account for the fact that, as 
detailed above, individuals greatly differ in their understanding of tran-
scendence: there is vertical transcendence and ultimacy and there is hor-
izontal transcendence and ultimacy. But exactly this may constitute the 
second coordinate for our construction of the religious field. Thus we work 
with two coordinates in constructing the religious field, which can now be 
integrated into one model: There are a) differences in the way transcend-
ence is understood and socially reconstructed, differences in the direction 
of transcendence and ultimacy (vertical and horizontal); there are b) dif-
ferences in the degree and structure of mediation of transcendence and 
ultimacy: institutional mediation vs. individual mediation. In Table 1, the 
ideal types of religious actors are presented. But also the middle-ground 
variants in both dimensions are accounted for in separate cells. This way, 
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we think, the types of actors in the contemporary implicit and explicit 
religious fields in  America and Europe can be outlined.
We are aware that we suggest a major change in the dimensions of the 
religious field by the inclusion of horizontal transcendence. As noted 
already, the type of religiosity featuring horizontal transcendence has 
max. — ← — Mediation of Transcendence and Ultimacy — → — min
(and thus: Degree of Organization)
Institutional Charismatic Individual 




of transcendence and 
ultimacy
Theistic religious sects, 
oppositional, prophe-
tic reli gious groups 
(eventually around a 
charis ma tic), featu ring 
theistic symboli zations 





belief and practice with 
theistic symboli zations 
of transcendence and 
ultimacy, practiced in 

























old and new estab lished 
religious traditions and 
institutions, featuring 
non-theistic religious 
symboli zations of 





(eventually around a 
charis ma tic), fea turing 
non-theistic religious 
symboli zations of 




belief and practice, 
featuring non-theistic 
religious sym boli zations 
of transcendence and 
ultimacy, practiced in 





ions that are (rather not 
regarded as “religious,” 
but) featuring experien-
ces of trans cendence 
and (ulti mate) concern 
with the sanctity or 





around a charis ma-
tic or idea) that are 
(rather not regarded 
as “religi ous,” but) 
featuring experi ences 
of transcend ence and 
(ulti mate) con cern with 
the sanctity or creativity 
of life and nature
Implicitly religious 
mystics,
individual belief and 
prac tice (rather not 
regarded as “reli gious,” 
but) featuring ex peri-
en ces of transcendence 
and (ulti mate) concern 
with the sanctity or 
creativity of life and 
nature; practiced in 
pri vate or occasional 
networksHorizontal
Table 1.  Ideal-Types in the American and European Religious Fields Con-
structed in the Frame of two Coordinates: Symbolization (y) and 
Mediation (x) of Transcendence and Ultimacy.
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been identified by different terms, “invisible religion” and “implicit reli-
gion” among them. We regard this inclusion as absolutely necessary for 
an adequate understanding of the contemporary religious landscape—and 
we may be among the first to suggest this inclusion into a religious field 
model which is derived from the classics. Thus we expect that this model 
of ideal-type actors in the contemporary religious fields in America and 
Europe may elicit critical and constructive response, but will also be con-
ceptually helpful for understanding the developments in contemporary 
religion and, not least, that it stands empirical testing.
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